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ALWAYS ALREADY SUSPECT: REVISING 
VULNERABILITY THEORY* 
FRANK RUDY COOPER** 
Martha Fineman proposes a post-identity “vulnerability” 
approach that focuses on burdens we all share; this article argues 
that theory needs to incorporate recognition of how invisible 
privileges exacerbate some people’s burdens. Vulnerability 
theory is based on a recognition that we are all born defenseless, 
become feeble, must fear natural disasters, and might be failed by 
social institutions. It thus argues for a strong state that takes 
affirmative steps to insure substantive equality of opportunity. 
While vulnerability theory might help explain and remedy 
situations like Hurricane Katrina, it also might be susceptible to 
an argument that racial profiling is a necessary sacrifice of those 
overrepresented in arrest statistics for the greater good of 
protecting the majority from vulnerability to crime.  
I argue that acknowledging relative privilege can help us analyze 
practices such as racial profiling. Privileges are invisible, 
unearned assets that automatically attach to people because an 
aspect of their identity is made socially normative. Because 
privileges can make the impact of racially targeted policing of 
others invisible to their holders, vulnerability theory needs to 
incorporate this concept if it wishes to address racial profiling. A 
revised vulnerability theory could then use the fact of our shared 
vulnerabilities and its justification of a strong state to call for 
extensive federal monitoring of policing. Linking vulnerability 
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theory to analysis of privilege is a necessary precursor to such a 
conversation. 
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The United States of America has a problem: police officers 
continue to target men of color for suspicion of wrongdoing.1 For 
 
 1. “Racial profiling” occurs when individuals or institutions use racial characteristics 
to associate individuals possessing those characteristics with bad behavior. See, e.g., Frank 
Rudy Cooper, Against Bipolar Black Masculinity: Intersectionality, Assimilation, Identity 
Performance, and Hierarchy, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 853, 857–58 (2006) (describing image 
of the “Bad Black Man” as rooted in stereotype of black male criminality); Neil Gotanda, 
Comparative Racialization: Racial Profiling and the Case of Wen Ho Lee, 47 UCLA L. 
REV. 1689, 1691 (2000) (detailing racial profiling of a Chinese scientist as a spy); Bernard 
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example, Judge Shira Scheindlin found as fact that the New York City 
Police Department’s (“NYPD”) aggressive “order-maintenance”2 
stop and frisk3 program disproportionately hounded young men of 
color and was not justified by any disparities in arrest or crime 
statistics.4 To respond, we need a capacious theory for addressing 
differential policing of men of color. 
In light of ongoing police racial profiling, the recent trend of 
construing equality as requiring a move beyond identities is a turn in 
the wrong direction. For instance, consider the “colorblind” and 
“antibalkanization” post-identity approaches. Colorblindness is 
exemplified by U.S. Supreme Court Chief Justice John Roberts’s 
argument that the way to end racial inequality is to act as though race 
 
E. Harcourt, Rethinking Racial Profiling: A Critique of the Economics, Civil Liberties, and 
Constitutional Literature, and of Criminal Profiling More Generally, 71 U. CHI. L. REV. 
1275, 1283–84 (2004) (showing how racial profiling is illogical); Anthony C. Thompson, 
Stopping the Usual Suspects: Race and the Fourth Amendment, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 956, 962 
(1999) (arguing that police use stereotypes of blacks as criminals). 
 2. Order-maintenance policing, sometimes known as “quality of life” policing, 
involves arresting people for petty offenses, such as sneaking free rides in public 
transportation or trying to squeegee car windows for tips, in order to improve the quality 
of life, particularly for mainstream civilians. See, e.g., Jeffrey Fagan & Garth Davies, Street 
Stops and Broken Windows: Terry, Race, and Disorder in New York City, 28 FORDHAM 
URB. L.J. 457, 461–62 (2000) (explaining order-maintenance policing); K. Babe Howell, 
Broken Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-Maintenance 
Policing, 33 N.Y.U. REV. L. & SOC. CHANGE 271, 276–80 (2009) (describing the 
development and problems with order-maintenance policing in New York City). Order-
maintenance policing derives from “broken windows” theory, which notes that if you let 
one window remain broken, it may encourage people to break other windows and thereby 
contends that if you allow minor crime to go unchecked, major crimes will follow. See 
George L. Kelling & James Q. Wilson, Broken Windows: The Police and Neighborhood 
Safety, ATLANTIC, Mar. 1982, at 3–4, available at http://www.theatlantic.com/ 
magazine/archive/1982/03/broken-windows/304465/. 
 3. A police “stop” occurs when an officer restricts the suspect’s freedom of 
movement and ability to terminate the encounter, but only temporarily and for purposes 
of investigating potential crime. See, e.g., Frank Rudy Cooper, The Un-Balanced Fourth 
Amendment: A Cultural Study of the Drug War, Racial Profiling and Arvizu, 47 VILL. L. 
REV. 851, 852, 882 n.205 (2002) (describing a stop). A police “frisk” occurs when an officer 
feels up the suspect or her effects, but only on the outside and in ways objectively designed 
to find weapons. See, e.g., Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 17 n.13 (describing a frisk as “feel[ing] 
with sensitive fingers every portion of the prisoner’s body . . . [including] the groin and 
area about the testicles . . .”); Cooper, supra, at 882 n.206. These forced seizures and 
searches were approved by the Supreme Court in Terry v. Ohio. 392 U.S. 1, 20, 27 (1968) 
(deciding the Fourth Amendment allows limited police seizures and searches of persons 
upon reasonable suspicion rather than the traditional, and higher, probable cause 
standard). 
 4. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 562 (S.D.N.Y. 2013), appeal 
dismissed, 770 F.3d 1051 (2014) (identifying disproportionate targeting of NYPD stops and 
frisks); id. at 585–86 (rejecting arrest or crime rates as the proper measure of expected 
stop ratios because the stopped population is overwhelmingly innocent). 
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does not exist.5 Antibalkanization is exemplified by Justice Anthony 
Kennedy’s assumption that identity groups must be disbanded in 
order to create racial equality.6 Both those arguments are “out of 
touch” with the reality that police officers continue to racially profile 
young men of color.7 The post-identity Justices are out of touch 
because they assume that racial hierarchy is at or near its end even as 
that idea is belied by the ongoing disproportionate policing of racial 
minorities.8 Fortunately, there is a post-identity theory that holds 
promise. 
Preeminent legal scholar Martha Fineman’s potentially better 
post-identity approach, known as vulnerability theory, says that 
people have a shared human condition of being susceptible to various 
forms of harm and argues for state protection of substantive equality.9 
 
 5. See Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 748 
(2007) (announcing judgment and stating opinion as to colorblindness: “The way to stop 
discrimination on the basis of race is to stop discriminating on the basis of race”). 
 6. Justice Kennedy voices this antibalkanization rationale for his anti-affirmative 
action stance in the Parents Involved and Ricci cases. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 
557 (2009) (Kennedy, J., delivering the opinion of the Court) (finding that a city’s 
discarding of a written qualification test on the grounds that the results prevented 
promoting qualified black firefighters in a heavily black city violated the equal protection 
rights of white and Latino firefighters who had performed highly on the written test); 
Parents Involved, 551 U.S. at 787 (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the 
judgment) (“The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often 
it does.”); Reva B. Siegel, From Colorblindness to Antibalkanization: An Emerging 
Ground of Decision in Race Equality Cases, 120 YALE L.J. 1278, 1282 (2011) (arguing that 
Justice Kennedy articulates an emerging antibalkanization approach). But see Darren 
Lenard Hutchinson, Preventing Balkanization or Facilitating Racial Domination: A 
Critique of the New Equal Protection, 22 VA. J. SOC. POL’Y & L. 1, 3–7 (2015) 
(documenting how antibalkanization rationale facilitates racial domination). 
 7. See Schuette v. Coal. to Defend Affirmative Action, Integration & Immigrant 
Rights & Fight for Equal. by Any Means Necessary (BAMN), 134 S. Ct. 1623, 1675 (2014) 
(Sotomayor, J., dissenting) (criticizing Roberts’ (in)famous call for colorblindness as “out 
of touch”). 
 8. See Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Continually Reminded of Their Inferior 
Position”: Social Dominance, Implicit Bias, Criminality, and Race, 46 J.L. & POL’Y 23, 
101–05 (2014) (applying social dominance theory to unpunished acts of racial violence); 
Darren Lenard Hutchinson, “Unexplainable on Grounds Other Than Race”: The Inversion 
of Privilege and Subordination in Equal Protection Jurisprudence, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 
615, 654 & nn.256–57 (pointing to racial profiling as an example of “the Supreme Court 
and several lower courts . . . immuniz[ing] law enforcement practices that take race, along 
with other factors, into account to burden persons of color in a way that replicates their 
historical domination”).  
 9. Vulnerability theory has sparked a rich and growing literature. See, e.g., Martha 
Albertson Fineman, Beyond Identities: The Limits of an Antidiscrimination Approach to 
Equality, 92 B.U. L. REV. 1713, 1718–19 (2012) [hereinafter Fineman, Beyond Identities] 
(arguing that the difference between the conception of equality in the United States of 
America and the conception of equality in other democracies arises from differing 
perceptions of human need and vulnerability); Martha Albertson Fineman, Feminism, 
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“Vulnerability” is the concept that we are born unable to protect 
ourselves, we become feeble with age, we must fear natural disasters, 
and our social institutions might work against us.10 For example, the 
people of New Orleans suffered both from the natural disaster of 
Hurricane Katrina and the social dysfunction of President George W. 
 
Masculinities, and Multiple Identities, 13 NEV. L.J. 619, 634–35 (2013) [hereinafter 
Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities] (critiquing multidimensional masculinities theory for 
considering particularized forms of identity); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable 
Subject: Anchoring Equality in the Human Condition, 20 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 9 
(2008) [hereinafter Fineman, Vulnerable Subject] (emphasizing that embodiment creates 
vulnerability); Martha Albertson Fineman, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive 
State, 60 EMORY L.J. 251, 267–70 (2010) [hereinafter Fineman, Responsive State] 
(highlighting that vulnerability is a shared human condition). For further examples of 
vulnerability theory, see generally VULNERABILITY: REFLECTIONS ON A NEW ETHICAL 
FOUNDATION FOR LAW AND POLITICS (Martha Albertson Fineman & Anna Grear eds., 2013) 
(collecting articles exploring vulnerability theory); Vulnerability and the Human Condition: 
Publications, EMORY U., http://web.gs.emory.edu/vulnerability/resources/Publications.html 
(last visited Feb. 27, 2015) (collecting resources regarding vulnerability theory). 
Nancy Dowd has challenged vulnerability theory to account for race and gender by 
showing how the case of black boys requires attention to interpersonal aggressions and 
institutional hurdles that make them vulnerable in unique ways. See Nancy E. Dowd, 
Unfinished Equality: The Case of Black Boys, 2 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUALITY 36, 36 (2013) 
[hereinafter Dowd, Unfinished Equality] (arguing for mixing vulnerability theory with 
identities theories); see also Nancy E. Dowd, Fatherhood and Equality: Reconfiguring 
Masculinities, 45 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 1047, 1051 (2012) (considering application of 
vulnerability theory to fatherhood). Dowd also challenges vulnerability theory to 
incorporate identities in an article on elder law. Nancy E. Dowd, Conceptualizing Elder 
Law, in INTRODUCTION TO THE NORMA ELDER LAW RESEARCH ENVIRONMENT: 
DIFFERENT APPROACHES TO ELDER LAW 11, 11–15 (Ann Numhauser-Henning ed., 
2013). 
Many others have entered the field of vulnerability theory. Kirsten Davis applies 
vulnerability theory to family law. See Kirsten K. Davis, Extending the Vision: An 
Empowerment Identity Approach to Work-Family Regulation as Applied to School 
Involvement Leave Statutes, 16 WM. & MARY J. WOMEN & L. 613, 619–20 (2010). Nina A. 
Kohn has also written an insightful analysis of vulnerability theory. See Nina A. Kohn, 
Vulnerability Theory and the Role of Government, 26 YALE J.L. & FEMINISM 1, 4–5 (2014) 
(considering vulnerability theory’s application to debates over equality and limited 
government). Darren Rosenblum provocatively considers vulnerability theory in relation 
to women’s rights under international law. See Darren Rosenblum, Unisex Cedaw, or 
What’s Wrong with Women’s Rights, 20 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 98, 140 (2011). Aziza 
Ahmed has also applied vulnerability theory to international rights. See Aziza Ahmed, 
Rugged Vaginas and Vulnerable Rectums: The Sexual Identity, Epidemiology, and Law of 
the Global HIV Epidemic, 26 COLUM. J. GENDER & L. 1, 5–7 (2013). Osamudia James 
recently considered vulnerability and race. See Osamudia R. James, White Like Me: The 
Negative Impact of the Diversity Rationale on White Identity Formation, 89 N.Y.U. L. REV. 
425, 425–26 (2014). Even more recently, Michèlle Alexandre uses vulnerability theory to 
argue that certain areas of law and culture are stagnated by sexual profiling and 
attachment to illusory gender-based distinctions. For her discussion on this topic, see 
generally MICHÈLLE ALEXANDRE, SEXPLOITATION: SEXUAL PROFILING AND THE 
ILLUSION OF GENDER (2015). 
 10. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 9.  
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Bush’s Federal Emergency Management Agency.11 Vulnerability 
theory thus argues that the government has an affirmative duty to 
protect substantive equality of opportunity not only by preventing 
vulnerability to natural disasters but also by correcting for social 
hurdles rooted in cultural stereotypes.12 Akin to colorblindness and 
antibalkanization approaches, vulnerability theory contends that 
identity theory thwarts the effectiveness of politically progressive13 
coalitions.14 Unlike colorblind and antibalkanization approaches, 
vulnerability theory acknowledges that our shared susceptibility to 
physical and social harms makes people dependent on one another.15 
I think these principles of interdependency and affirmative 
government duty are ones that people who disagree with racial 
profiling can build upon. 
Critics of racial profiling will have to revise vulnerability theory, 
though, because its post-identity approach prevents it from addressing 
police officers’ differential treatment of men of color. Vulnerability 
theory currently suggests that since law operates through 
generalization, legal theorists should reject calls for specifying the 
 
 11. See Sheryll Cashin, Katrina: The American Dilemma Redux, in AFTER THE 
STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA 29, 
29–37 (David Dante Troutt ed., 2006) (arguing that race played a role in FEMA’s 
response to Hurricane Katrina). For an interesting insight into the evacuation experience 
of New Orleans natives, see Mitchell F. Crusto, Letters from a Native Son: Do You Know 
What It Means to Miss New Orleans, in HURRICANE KATRINA: AMERICA’S UNNATURAL 
DISASTER 23, 23–34 (Jeremy I. Levitt & Matthew C. Whitaker eds., 2009). 
 12. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 638 (discussing need for 
state to foster resiliency); see also Dowd, Unfinished Equality, supra note 9, at 36 (defining 
vulnerability theory as placing affirmative duties upon state); Fineman, Beyond Identities, 
supra note 9, at 1752 (arguing that state has responsibility to ameliorate injuries). Family 
Law scholar Linda C. McClain also calls for using substantive equality as our means of 
seeking a more progressive society. See Linda C. McClain, What’s So Hard About Sex 
Equality?: Nature, Culture, and Social Engineering, in TRANSCENDING THE BOUNDARIES 
OF LAW: GENERATIONS OF FEMINISM AND LEGAL THEORY 67, 82 (Martha Albertson 
Fineman ed., 2011). 
 13. By “progressive,” I mean the cluster of ideas centering on assumed 
interdependence of individuals, willingness to regulate markets, comfort with strong 
government, and generally seeking ever-increasing progress toward greater equality of 
opportunity. By “conservative,” I refer to a cluster of ideas centering around small 
government, traditional social values, assumed individual autonomy and liberty, and 
unregulated markets.  
 14. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 628 (suggesting that 
identity theory has contributed to the destruction of political alliances and has impeded 
the creation of effective coalitions). 
 15. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 11 (describing feminist model of 
subjectivity “in which the liberal subject is enmeshed in a web of relationships 
and . . . dependent upon them”). 
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particular experiences of social groups.16 That cannot work because of 
the reality that people have understood,17 and will continue to 
understand, themselves and others through the lens of identities.18 
Worse yet, vulnerability theory is susceptible to the argument that we 
need more order-maintenance policing, not less. Police departments 
could easily argue that racial minority overrepresentation in arrest 
statistics should be reflected in race-based stops and frisks for the 
greater good of protecting the most people from vulnerability to 
crime.19 Since vulnerability theory refuses to focus on race, gender, 
and age identities, it would be unable to respond to such an argument 
by showing how and why order-maintenance policing is facially 
neutral but implicitly racially biased.20 The ultimate problem with 
vulnerability theory is that while, unlike colorblindness and 
antibalkanization approaches, it does not deny the existence of racial 
hierarchy, it still proposes a solution that ignores race. 
A revised vulnerability approach would keep what is most 
beneficial in vulnerability theory, the concepts of people’s 
interdependence and the necessity of a strong state, but would add 
the element of recognizing relative privilege. A privilege is “a special 
advantage, immunity, permission, right, or benefit granted to or 
 
 16. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 620–26. 
 17. See generally RACE AND RACES: CASES AND RESOURCES FOR A DIVERSE 
AMERICA (Juan F. Perea et al. eds., 2d ed. 2007) (teaching about race and law with 
substantial attention to historical construction of legal meanings of blacks, Native 
American, Latina/o, Asian, and white identities). 
 18. On ongoing prejudice, see, for example, MAHZARIN R. BANAJI & ANTHONY G. 
GREENWALD, BLIND SPOT: HIDDEN BIASES OF GOOD PEOPLE, at xii (2013) (describing 
how implicit bias continues and affects behavior); L. Song Richardson & Phillip Atiba 
Goff, Interrogating Racial Violence, 12 OHIO ST. J. CRIM. L. 115, 119 (2014) (connecting 
implicit bias and masculinity threat to violence). 
 19. In fact, former Republican New York City Mayor Michael Bloomberg made just 
such an argument following Judge Scheindlin’s Floyd decision. Michael R. Bloomberg, 
“Stop and Frisk” Keeps New York Safe, WASH. POST (Aug. 18, 2013), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/michael-bloomberg-stop-and-frisk-keeps-new-
york-safe/2013/08/18/8d4cd8c4-06cf-11e3-9259-e2aafe5a5f84_story.html; see also HEATHER 
MAC DONALD, ARE COPS RACIST? 28–34 (2003) (arguing there is no systematic racial 
profiling because racially disparate arrest rates (assumed to be legitimate) justify racially 
disparate suspicion). But see ZERO TOLERANCE: QUALITY OF LIFE AND THE NEW 
POLICE BRUTALITY IN NEW YORK CITY 10–11 (Andrea McArdle & Tanya Erzen eds., 
2001) (collecting articles critiquing rationales for order-maintenance policing in New York 
City). Scholars have shown that the empirical support for race as an indicator of 
suspiciousness is lacking. For an example, see generally Bernard E. Harcourt & Jens 
Ludwig, Broken Windows: New Evidence from New York City and a Five-City Social 
Experiment, 73 U. CHI. L. REV. 271 (2006).  
 20. See, e.g., Dorothy E. Roberts, Supreme Court Review: Foreword: Race, Vagueness, 
and the Social Meaning of Order-Maintenance Policing, 89 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 
775, 790 (1999) (arguing order-maintenance policing is inherently racially biased). 
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enjoyed by an individual, class, or caste.”21 Privilege makes the harms 
of police targeting invisible to those who do not to fit the profile. I 
suggest thinking of a privilege as an unearned benefit that has already 
been conferred on you by the invisible operation of social norms and 
will continue to operate to your benefit unless you affirmatively 
disgorge the privilege. The theory of privilege shows that whiteness, 
maleness, heterosexuality, and other privileged statuses are the 
unacknowledged norms for how society is structured.22 Because of the 
way those norms interact in social practices, the status of being young, 
male, and of color makes one vulnerable to racial profiling. While 
vulnerability theory helps us challenge the state to address the harm 
of racial profiling, the theory of privilege is necessary to understand 
why elites allow racial profiling to continue. I thus argue for revising 
vulnerability theory such that it acknowledges the ways identities and 
privileges influence social practices. 
 Part I of this Article defines the problem by reviewing Floyd v. 
City of New York23 and its holding that the NYPD unconstitutionally 
racially profiled young black and Latino men24 and traces that 
disparate treatment to the NYPD’s order-maintenance approach to 
policing. Part II explicates vulnerability theory, especially its reasons 
for a post-identity approach. It describes the elements of 
vulnerability—its universality, constancy, complexity, and 
particularity—as well as its implications: that the state must foster 
people’s resilience by continually reviewing its institutions to ensure 
 
 21. STEPHANIE M. WILDMAN, PRIVILEGE REVEALED: HOW INVISIBLE 
PREFERENCE UNDERMINES AMERICA 13 (1996) (citation omitted), quoted in Danielle 
Kie Hart, Revealing Privilege—Why Bother?, 42 WASH. U. J.L. & POL’Y 131, 134 (2013). 
The source of this topic is Peggy McIntosh’s work, White Privilege and Male Privilege: A 
Personal Account of Coming to See Correspondences Through Work in Women’s Studies 
(Wellesley Coll. Ctr. for Research on Women, Working Paper No. 189, 1988) (coining the 
term “white privilege”). For examples of this concept’s use, see Phoebe A. Haddon, Has 
the Roberts Court Plurality’s Colorblind Rhetoric Finally Broken Brown’s Promise?, 90 
DENV. U. L. REV. 1251, 1251 (2013) (arguing that the Supreme Court has “wrongly 
embraced a colorblind interpretation of the Equal Protection Clause”); Catherine Smith, 
Queer as Black Folk?, 2007 WIS. L. REV. 379, 383 (discussing privilege in the area of 
heterosexual and homosexual relationships); Stephanie M. Wildman, Privilege, Gender, 
and the Fourteenth Amendment: Reclaiming Equal Protection of the Laws, 13 TEMP. POL. 
& CIV. RTS. L. REV. 707, 710 (2004) (discussing the concept of systemic privilege as it 
relates to the Fourteenth Amendment); Mara Shulman Ryan, Note, Invisible in the 
Courtroom Too: Modifying the Law of Selective Enforcement to Account for White 
Privilege, 34 W. NEW ENG. L. REV. 301, 302 (2012) (arguing that white privilege and 
racism impacted a criminal investigation and prosecution). 
 22. See Hart, supra note 21, at 134–35 (discussing invisibility of hierarchized binary 
statuses of privilege and disadvantage). 
 23. 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 24. Id. at 562 (noting demographics of stops). 
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that they foster equality of opportunity. Part III finds fault with 
aspects of vulnerability theory. Specifically, it contends that a 
universal perspective is impossible and that identities, while socially 
constructed, are materially crucial. Part IV proposes a better model 
for progressive scholarship by infusing vulnerability theory with 
acknowledgement of the relative privileges that identity statuses 
create. This Part more thoroughly illustrates the theory of privilege 
and suggests what a post-privilege vulnerability theory would look 
like. Part V briefly concludes. 
I.  THE PROBLEM: ONGOING RACIAL PROFILING 
Racial profiling is an ongoing problem rooted in legal and social 
ideologies. The legal ideology is the idea that police ought to have 
wide discretion. We see this in the low threshold of justification for 
Terry v. Ohio25 stop and frisks. We also see this in the pretext 
doctrine’s refusal to consider even admittedly racially prejudiced 
policing to be “unreasonable” under the Fourth Amendment.26 
The social roots of racial profiling are explicit and implicit bias 
against racial minorities, as exacerbated by acceptance of certain 
policing methodologies. First, many police officers explicitly use 
arrest statistics to justify a belief that racial minorities are more crime 
prone. Second, pervasive and deep-seated implicit bias against racial 
minorities means that racial minorities tend to look more suspicious 
even when engaged in the same behaviors as racial majorities. Third, 
the “order-maintenance” policing methodology of aggressively 
policing minor offenses, particularly in certain neighborhoods, results 
in racially disparate policing.27 Order-maintenance policing was 
influential nationwide, so it is unsurprising that the racial disparities 
found in the Floyd case are typical.28 
 
 25. 392 U.S. 1 (1968).  
 26. See Whren v. United States, 517 U.S. 806, 813 (1996) (concluding Fourth 
Amendment’s reasonableness analysis precludes considering police officers’ subjective 
intentions, thereby destroying defendant’s Fourth Amendment challenge despite the fact 
that undercover vice officers targeted two young black men in violation of local police 
regulations).  
 27. See generally Kelling & Wilson, supra note 2 (propounding the theory). 
 28. See, e.g., ACLU, BLACK, BROWN AND TARGETED: A REPORT ON BOSTON POLICE 
DEPARTMENT STREET ENCOUNTERS FROM 2007–2010, at 5–10 (2014), available at 
https://www.aclum.org/sites/all/files/images/education/stopandfrisk/black_brown_and _targeted 
_online.pdf (Boston); Katherine Beckett et al., Drug Use, Drug Possession Arrests, and the 
Question of Race: Lessons from Seattle, 52 SOC. PROBS. 419, 435–36 (2005) (Seattle); ACLU 
Takes Battle to End Racial Profiling to the Turnpike, ACLU (Oct. 4, 2001), 
https://www.aclu.org/racial-justice/aclu-takes-battle-end-racial-profiling-turnpike (New Jersey).  
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1339 (2015) 
1348 NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 93 
In section A of this Part of the Article, I trace the roots of racial 
profiling to excessive legal discretion afforded to police officers, 
implicit bias, and the order-maintenance approach. In Part B, I review 
the Floyd decision as a means of demonstrating that we need a 
theoretical approach to law and culture that addresses racial profiling. 
A. The Legal and Social Underpinnings of Racial Profiling 
By now, the legal and social underpinnings of widespread racial 
profiling are relatively clear. The power of police to racially profile is 
created by the incredible discretion afforded them by federal criminal 
procedure doctrine.29 Officers often may conduct intermediate 
seizures and searches of suspects upon merely articulating suspicion 
of crime or the presence of weapons that amounts to little more than 
a hunch.30 This power derives from the decisions in the Camara v. 
Municipal Court31 and Terry cases. In Camara, the Supreme Court 
implicitly overturned the then-assumed rule that if an intrusion 
constituted a “seizure” or “search” under the Fourth Amendment, it 
had to be supported by probable cause.32 Such an assumption makes 
sense, given that the Fourth Amendment specifies that warrants pre-
authorizing a search must be based upon probable cause.33 However, 
the Camara Court held that the Amendment’s earlier statement of a 
prohibition of “unreasonable” searches and seizures could govern 
intrusions made for regulatory purposes rather than law enforcement 
 
 29. See generally Donald A. Dripps, The Fourth Amendment and the Fallacy of 
Composition: Determinacy Versus Legitimacy in a Regime of Bright-Line Rules, 74 MISS. 
L.J. 341, 392–93 (2004) (arguing that citizens are made more vulnerable to police discretion 
by an “Iron Triangle” of cases preventing considering police officer’s subjective intentions 
during searches incident to arrest during vehicle searches). 
 30. See Alabama v. White, 496 U.S. 325, 330–32 (1990) (holding that a “totality of the 
circumstances” approach was the correct way to assess reasonable suspicion); see, e.g., 
Illinois v. Wardlow, 528 U.S. 119, 125 (2000) (concluding that running at sight of police in 
a high-crime neighborhood can give rise to reasonable suspicion). 
 31. 387 U.S. 523 (1967). 
 32. See Camara v. Mun. Court, 387 U.S. 523, 529, 534 (1967) (issuing landlord writ of 
prohibition preventing warrantless apartment search and characterizing Frank v. 
Maryland, 359 U.S. 360 (1959), as warrant-probable cause “exception”). On this implicit 
rule, see Frank Rudy Cooper, Cultural Context Matters: Terry’s “Seesaw Effect”, 56 OKLA. 
L. REV. 833, 852 (2003) (suggesting there was a pre-Terry understanding that probable 
cause is required for a search or seizure). 
 33. See U.S. CONST. amend. IV (“The right of the people to be secure in their 
persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not 
be violated, and no Warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause, supported by Oath or 
affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and the persons or things 
to be seized.” (emphasis added)). 
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purposes.34 Thus, the validity of a search under a municipal code 
requiring proper trash collection or working fire extinguishers is 
judged under a flexible “reasonableness” standard.35 
The lower threshold of justification for regulatory searches in 
Camara set the stage for a sea change the following year in Terry. 
Well before the Camara and Terry cases, police had been doing “field 
interrogations” in which they “stopped” suspicious persons and 
“frisked” them for weapons despite lacking probable cause to arrest 
or search those civilians.36 Legal scholar John Q. Barrett reveals that 
stops and frisks were created in order to control Italians in New York 
City in the early 1900s, which may itself have been a form of racial 
profiling.37 These stops and frisks were basically outside the usual 
federal constitutional rules, as police often argued they were not 
“searches” and state courts sometimes allowed them on less than the 
usual probable cause standard.38 The Terry Court split the proverbial 
baby by applying Camara’s reasonableness analysis rather than 
requiring probable cause.39 As I have argued elsewhere, the Terry 
Court created a “scope continuum” approach to the Fourth 
Amendment by saying that the fact that stops and frisks were less 
intrusive than arrests and “full blown” searches meant they could be 
allowed upon a showing of an intermediate level of justification.40 
What would come to be known as “reasonable suspicion” justifies a 
stop or frisk, whereas no justification is required to conduct a 
nonseizure or nonsearch and probable cause is required to conduct an 
arrest or full blown search.41 The only limit on stops and frisks is that 
 
 34. Camara, 387 U.S. at 534. See generally Cooper, supra note 3, at 852–56 (arguing 
that Camara limited the application of the “reasonableness” balancing approach).  
 35. See Cooper, supra note 3, at 852 (explicating Camara case).  
 36. See, PRESIDENT’S COMM’N ON LAW ENFORCEMENT & ADMIN. OF JUSTICE, U.S. 
DEP’T OF JUSTICE, NO. 147374, TASK FORCE REPORT: THE POLICE 39–40 (1967). 
 37. See John Q. Barrett, Terry v. Ohio: The Fourth Amendment Reasonableness of 
Police Stops and Frisks Based on Less Than Probable Cause, in CRIMINAL PROCEDURE 
STORIES: AN IN-DEPTH LOOK AT LEADING CRIMINAL PROCEDURE CASES 295, 299–300 
(Carol S. Steiker ed., 2006) (noting early usage of stops and frisks). See generally 
JENNIFER GUGLIELMO & SALVATORE SALERNO, ARE ITALIANS WHITE?: HOW RACE IS 
MADE IN AMERICA (2003) (analyzing treatment of Italians as a nonwhite race).  
 38. Cf. Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 10 (1968) (describing then-existing legal landscape 
for stops and frisks). 
 39. See id. at 30. 
 40. Frank Rudy Cooper, The “Seesaw Effect” from Racial Profiling to Depolicing: 
Toward a Critical Cultural Theory, in THE NEW CIVIL RIGHTS RESEARCH 139, 142–43 
(Benjamin Fleury-Steiner & Laura Beth Nielsen eds., 2006). 
 41. See 4 WAYNE R. LAFAVE, SEARCH AND SEIZURE: A TREATISE ON THE FOURTH 
AMENDMENT § 9.4(e) (5th ed. 2012) (distinguishing stop and frisk from arrest and full 
blown search). 
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the officer must assert “specific and articulable” facts amounting to 
more than a “hunch.”42 This low reasonable suspicion threshold 
makes it easy for police officers to conduct searches and seizures on 
civilians when they do not have much basis for the intrusion. For 
example, if the police officer has more than a hunch as a basis for 
stopping someone, she will usually be able to frisk the suspect, which 
includes careful exploration of the “groin.”43 If the police officer then 
“plain feels” a marijuana cigarette or unlicensed gun, she may arrest 
that suspect.44 So, one way police officers have excessive discretion is 
that they only need a little more than a hunch in order to seize and 
search civilians. 
The pretext doctrine is another source of excessive police officer 
discretion. The pretext doctrine says that when police officers 
objectively have probable cause to arrest or fully search someone, it is 
irrelevant to the Fourth Amendment reasonableness analysis that the 
police officers were actually using the objective justification as a 
pretext for a seizure or search they could not justify. Hence, in Whren 
v. United States,45 the Supreme Court held that whenever a police 
officer objectively has a “fair probability” that crime is afoot, any 
actual racist reason for arresting or fully searching someone is 
insulated from Fourth Amendment scrutiny.46 Elsewhere, the Court 
has held that probable cause may be established by a mere one in 
three chance.47 Moreover, if a police officer may arrest someone, she 
may also fully search them incident to arrest without any further 
justification.48 In practice, then, an officer’s pure hunch of a drug 
crime, in conjunction with a less than fifty percent chance of any petty 
crime, such as jaywalking, may become an excuse for an arrest and 
full blown search.49 The pretext doctrine is thus a second important 
source of excessive police officer discretion. 
 
 42. Terry, 392 U.S. at 21–22.  
 43. Id. at 17 n.13.  
 44. See, e.g., Illinois v. Andreas, 463 U.S. 765, 771–72 (1983) (defining police officer 
seeing an object immediately identifiable as evidence of crime as non-search under Fourth 
Amendment).  
 45. 517 U.S. 806 (1996). 
 46. See id. at 813. 
 47. See Maryland v. Pringle, 540 U.S. 366, 372 (2003) (holding probable cause 
established on theories that one of three suspects or all three in concert possessed drugs in 
a car); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213, 214, 246 (1983) (creating “totality of circumstances” 
approach to probable cause).  
 48. See United States v. Robinson, 414 U.S. 218, 236 (1973) (holding that, during a 
search incident to arrest, an officer’s subjective rationales for the search are irrelevant).  
 49. See Atwater v. City of Lago Vista, 532 U.S. 318, 354 (2001). 
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Given implicit bias against racial minorities in society at large50 
and explicit belief among police officers in particular that minorities 
are more likely to be criminals,51 it should not be a surprise that 
officers most often use their wide discretion to target racial 
minorities.52 Indeed, studies show that everyone has implicit biases 
against socially stigmatized groups.53 These biases are generally 
stronger among normative groups, but deriving from history and 
culture, they are pervasive.54 For our purposes, it suffices to say that 
widespread implicit bias has been scientifically proven.55 
Further research shows that implicit bias against racial minorities 
is at least as strong, if not stronger, among police officers. 
Notwithstanding the fact that police officer bias in targeting could 
produce racially disparate arrest statistics, officers often use arrest 
statistics to justify targeting racial minorities. Sociologist and legal 
scholar Bernard Harcourt has criticized the “ratchet effect” created 
by targeting people of color for arrest, then rationalizing further 
targeting of racial minorities based on the racial disparate arrest 
statistics that the targeting itself produces.56 Legal scholar L. Song 
Richardson has pointed out that police officers’ insistence on racial 
profiling is irrational.57 She cites many jurisdictions where the “hit 
rates” for finding evidence of crime on suspects are much lower for 
racial minorities than for whites.58 For Richardson, the over targeting 
of racial minorities is the result of conscious racial profiling 
magnifying implicit biases.59 It should be no surprise that a legal 
landscape that provides excessive discretion to police officers, 
 
 50. See Jerry Kang & Mahzarin R. Banaji, Fair Measures: A Behavioral Realist 
Revision of “Affirmative Action,” 94 CALIF. L. REV. 1063, 1108–10 (2006) (arguing for 
debiasing method of confronting broad societal bias). 
 51. See Aziz Z. Huq et al., Why Does the Public Cooperate with Law Enforcement? 
The Influence of the Purposes and Targets of Policing, 17 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 419, 
419–20 (2011) (noting consensus that police have traditionally targeted racial minorities). 
 52. See, e.g., id. 
 53. See generally BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 18 (summarizing the research 
on implicit bias and showing that everyone has implicit biases against socially stigmatized 
groups). 
 54. See generally id. (discussing nature and source of implicit bias).  
 55. See generally id. (detailing the social science methodology that has revealed 
implicit bias). To take an implicit bias test, see Overview, PROJECT IMPLICIT, 
https://implicit.harvard.edu/implicit/education.html (last visited Mar. 7, 2015). 
 56. See BERNARD E. HARCOURT, AGAINST PREDICTION: PROFILING, POLICING, 
AND PUNISHING IN AN ACTUARIAL AGE 145–72 (2007) (discussing police officer use of 
arrest statistics to justify targeting racial minorities). 
 57. L. Song Richardson, Arrest Efficiency and the Fourth Amendment, 95 MINN. L. 
REV. 2035, 2035–37 (2011). 
 58. Id. at 2037–38.  
 59. Id. at 2039–40. 
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coupled with a culture where implicit bias against racial minorities is 
rampant, leads to racial targeting. 
Since about 2000, the police methodology of order-maintenance 
policing has exacerbated the legal and cultural factors leading to 
racial profiling. Scholars have linked the dramatic racial disparities in 
stop and frisk statistics to order-maintenance policing.60 Order-
maintenance policing is based on a theory that police officers must 
prevent the appearance of disorder.61 For reasons of implicit bias, 
racial minority communities are disproportionately perceived as 
disordered.62 Accordingly, they will continue to be targeted and 
patrolled at a higher rate. This is a self-fulfilling prophecy: the 
perception of a disordered community justifies excessive police 
officer targeting of its residents, with those arrest statistics then being 
used to justify further scrutiny.63  
Legal scholar K. Babe Howell ties together the legal, social, and 
police methodology elements of racial profiling in her article, Broken 
Lives from Broken Windows: The Hidden Costs of Aggressive Order-
Maintenance Policing.64 As Howell poignantly shows, the overall 
impact of racial profiling of young men of color is to create a distinct 
justice system for young men of color: 
When police stop suburban kids and find marijuana, they throw 
away the drugs and speak to their parents. On the rare 
occasions when suburbanites or wealthy people are arrested for 
minor offenses, they hire attorneys, point to their clean records, 
and refuse to accept a disposition short of dismissal. 
On the other hand, people who live in New York City’s 
communities of color are subjected to [zero tolerance 
policing].65 
Howell’s assessment of the way order-maintenance policing imposes 
differential costs should lead us to challenge this form of racial 
 
 60. See Fagan & Davies, supra note 2, at 477. 
 61. See Kelling & Wilson, supra note 2, at 1.  
 62. L. Song Richardson, Cognitive Bias, Police Character, and the Fourth Amendment, 
44 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 267, 268 (2012). 
 63. See Bernard E. Harcourt, Reflecting on the Subject: A Critique of the Social 
Influence Conception of Deterrence, the Broken Windows Theory, and Order-Maintenance 
Policing New York Style, 97 MICH. L. REV. 291, 365 (1998). 
 64. See generally Howell, supra note 2 (providing her discussion of legal, social, and 
police methodology elements). 
 65. K. Babe Howell, From Page to Practice and Back Again: Broken Windows 
Policing and the Real Costs to Law-Abiding New Yorkers of Color, 34 N.Y.U. REV. L. & 
SOC. CHANGE 439, 442 (2010). 
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profiling. Such a challenge was undertaken in litigation culminating in 
Judge Scheindlin’s Floyd v. City of New York decision. 
B. Floyd v. City of New York 
In light of widespread racial profiling nationwide, the Floyd 
court’s decision to ban NYPD racial profiling stands as a potential 
watershed moment. In sum, Judge Scheindlin found, sitting as trier of 
fact, that the NYPD had a policy and practice of aggressively Terry-
stopping and frisking “the right people.”66 The result of the NYPD’s 
practice was 4.4 million stops between 2004–2012.67 Of those stops, 
fifty-two percent were of blacks, who constituted twenty-three 
percent of the New York City population.68 Meanwhile, thirty-one 
percent of stops were of Latinas/os, who were twenty-nine percent of 
the population.69 Somehow, though, only ten percent of stops were of 
whites, who amounted to fully thirty-three percent of the 
population.70 Despite this practice, there was a statistically significant 
lower chance of finding evidence of crime on racial minorities.71 It is 
thus hard to explain the racial disparities in whom the NYPD 
targeted. Worse yet, police used more force on racial minorities.72 
Based on expert testimony, Judge Scheindlin determined that these 
disparities could not be explained by any racial disparities in arrest or 
crime rates.73 Finally, and alarmingly, Judge Scheindlin found as a fact 
and conclusion of law that “at least 200,000” of the stops were 
unconstitutional.74 
Clinical law professor Nicole Smith Futrell has pointed out two 
especially telling statements about NYPD’s racial profiling effects on 
New York City’s racial minorities.75 First, one stop and frisk victim 
said, “When you’re young and you’re black, no matter how you look, 
 
 66. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 561 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 67. Id. at 558. 
 68. Id. at 559. 
 69. Id. 
 70. Id. 
 71. See id. at 559–60. 
 72. Id. at 560. 
 73. Id. (“The City and its highest officials believe that blacks and Hispanics should be 
stopped at the same rate as their proportion of the local criminal suspect population. But 
this reasoning is flawed because the stopped population is overwhelmingly innocent—not 
criminal. There is no basis for assuming that an innocent population shares the same 
characteristics as the criminal suspect population in the same area.”). 
 74. Id. at 559.  
 75. See generally Nicole Smith Futrell, Vulnerable, Not Voiceless: Outsider Narrative 
in Advocacy Against Discriminatory Policing, 93 N.C. L. REV. 1597 (2015) (using 
narratives of African American men to highlight NYPD’s stop and frisk racial profiling). 
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you fit the description.”76 This statement, which is supported by the 
Floyd statistics, illustrates police officer feelings that their reason for 
stopping racial minority suspects did not matter. Second, at the Floyd 
bench trial, stop and frisk victim Tyquan Brehon testified that “I have 
been taken in a lot of times because if you are stopping me I am 
gonna want to know why and that is when you hear a change in their 
tone.”77 Here, we see that police felt they could act with immunity to 
challenge and essentially arrest people for “contempt of cop.”78 
The Floyd decision is so interesting because it uses the equal 
protection doctrine to strike down racial profiling. Until this opinion, 
the equal protection doctrine had been seen as an inadequate means 
of remedying racial profiling.79 Nonetheless, Judge Scheindlin struck 
down the NYPD’s racial profiling as a facial violation of the equal 
protection doctrine based on the policy of stopping “the right 
people.”80 She also struck down the policy in the alternative on 
grounds that, if deemed facially neutral, the discriminatory purpose of 
the program could be inferred from the starkness of the racial 
disparities in stops as well as rates of discovering evidence of crime.81  
C. Where Are We Now? 
In the wake of the election of Mayor Bill de Blasio, New York 
City dropped its appeal of Judge Scheindlin’s opinion.82 Part of the 
cost of that decision, though, has been police officer resentment of the 
Mayor.83 On multiple occasions recently, large numbers of NYPD 
officers have physically turned their backs on Mayor de Blasio as he 
 
 76. Ross Tuttle & Erin Schneider, Stopped-and-Frisked: “For Being a F**king Mutt”, 
NATION (Oct. 8, 2012), http://www.thenation.com/article/170413/stopped-and-frisked-
being-fking-mutt-video (video). 
 77. Julie Dressner & Edwin Martinez, The Scars of Stop-and-Frisk, N.Y. TIMES (June 
12, 2012), http://www.nytimes.com/video/opinion/100000001601732/the-scars-of-stop-and-
frisk.html (video).  
 78. “Contempt of Cop” is a means of describing situations where police officers 
punish civilians for disrespecting them. Frank Rudy Cooper, Masculinities, Post-Racialism 
and the Gates Controversy: The False Equivalence Between Officer and Civilian, 11 NEV. 
L.J. 1, 15 (2010). 
 79. Brown v. City of Oneonta, 221 F.3d 329, 333–34 (2d Cir. 2000) (upholding stop of 
all young black males in town upon description of suspect as black). 
 80. Floyd v. City of New York, 959 F. Supp. 2d 540, 663 (S.D.N.Y. 2013). 
 81. Id. at 662. 
 82. Benjamin Weiser & Joseph Goldstein, Mayor Says New York City Will Settle Suits 
on Stop-and-Frisk Tactics, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 30, 2014), http://www.nytimes.com/2014/01/31 
/nyregion/de-blasio-stop-and-frisk.html?_r=0.  
 83. See Adam Klasfeld, Stop-and-Frisk Reform Talks Will Include NYC Cop Unions, 
COURTHOUSE NEWS SERVICE (Mar. 19, 2015), http://www.courthousenews.com/ 
2015/03/19/stop-and-frisk-reform-talks-will-include-nyc-cop-unions.htm.  
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gave speeches.84 This suggests that police disrespect for civilian review 
of their practices is at very high levels. Meanwhile, the racial profiling 
identified in New York City has been discovered elsewhere as well. 
For example, the New Jersey ACLU and the Massachusetts ACLU 
have issued reports on stop and frisk suggesting the problem is 
pervasive.85 Our present condition of hyper-policing of men of color 
raises this question: what perspective can deliver us from this 
predicament? 
II.  WHAT IS VULNERABILITY THEORY? 
Based on her perception that identity-based theories are 
inadequate,86 Fineman proposes that we base a progressive theory on 
the universal human condition of vulnerability. Her model for 
vulnerability theory boils down to a desire to see everyone as sharing 
a universal human condition and a call for the state to take greater 
responsibility for arranging institutions such that they will prevent 
and ameliorate injuries.87 Despite generally agreeing that the state 
must take greater responsibility for providing people with the 
resources they need to flourish, identities theorists have several 
reasons to be worried about vulnerability theory’s post-identity 
approach. I discuss those concerns in the next Part of the Article. 
My goal in this Part is to be fair to vulnerability theory before 
critiquing it. This Part will proceed as follows. Section A explicates 
some essential ingredients of vulnerability theory. Section B discusses 
implications of the theory for methodology and governance. 
A. The Elements of Vulnerability 
Vulnerability theory is built upon “the realization that many 
[physically or psychologically harmful] events are ultimately beyond 
human control.”88 For example, we are far from capable of preventing 
weather disasters, such as hurricanes. Similarly, the social world can 
make people vulnerable. For instance, the administration of the 
second President Bush was widely criticized for its response to 
 
 84. See Rebecca Kaplan, NYPD Chief: “Inappropriate” for Officers to Turn Backs on 
Mayor Again, CBS NEWS (Dec. 28, 2014, 12:13 PM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/nypd-
chief-bratton-inappropriate-for-officers-to-turn-backs-on-mayor-again/ (discussing officers 
turning their backs on the Mayor in the wake of the deaths of Michael Brown and Eric 
Garner). 
 85. ACLU, supra note 28, at 1. 
 86. See Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 254 n.11 (declaring “insufficiency 
of identity-focused equality”). 
 87. Id. at 269. 
 88. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 9. 
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Hurricane Katrina.89 Further, vulnerability is the possibility of injury 
to both oneself and one’s relationships. The relationships that are 
injured could be between two individuals, such as between a father 
and son, or between institutions of the state and the individual or 
groups of individuals. As an example of how the relationship between 
institutions and groups can itself be broken and injurious to 
individuals, consider the fact that black and Latino boys (as well as 
less-lauded Asians such as Cambodians) are disproportionately 
doubted academically and suspended.90 According to vulnerability 
theory, these examples show that we are all constantly subject to 
injury to the self and to our relationships. 
Vulnerability theory goes beyond the harms that occur to 
individuals and makes social institutions themselves vulnerable. 
According to Fineman, “institutions such as the family . . . are unable 
to eliminate individual vulnerability and are themselves vulnerable 
structures susceptible to harm and change.”91 Institutions like the 
family are vulnerable in that families are recognized by the state and 
may be supported or harmed by its laws, such as through tax 
benefits.92 So, vulnerability is personal, relational, and institutional, all 
at once.  
Vulnerability is also co-constituted by all three of those aspects.93 
Hence, individuals influence relationships and institutions, 
relationships influence individuals and institutions, and institutions 
influence individuals and relationships. None of these aspects is 
completely separate from the other. We thus see vulnerability cutting 
 
 89. See generally AFTER THE STORM: BLACK INTELLECTUALS EXPLORE THE 
MEANING OF HURRICANE KATRINA, supra note 11 (collecting articles on fallout from 
Hurricane Katrina); MITCHELL F. CRUSTO, LIBERTY: HOW CRISIS DEFINES OUR RIGHTS 
(forthcoming Carolina Academic Press, 2015) (using Katrina stories to illustrate 
constitutional principles).  
 90. See PEDRO A. NOGUERA, THE TROUBLE WITH BLACK BOYS: AND OTHER 
REFLECTIONS ON RACE, EQUITY, AND THE FUTURE OF PUBLIC EDUCATION, at xxi 
(2008) (summarizing negative stereotypes about and treatment of black boys in schools); 
see also Dowd, Unfinished Equality, supra note 9, at 51 (citing Tyrone C. Howard, Who 
Really Cares? The Disenfranchisement of African American Males in PreK-12 Schools: A 
Critical Race Theory Perspective, 110 TCHR. C. REC. 954, 974 (2008)) (citing research on 
low expectations and over-punishment of black boys). 
 91. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 11. 
 92. See, e.g., United States v. Windsor, 133 S. Ct. 2675, 2695 (2013) (holding that a 
lesbian spouse could not be denied tax benefits under the Defense of Marriage Act).  
 93. “Co-constituted” means that two or more institutions, identities, etc., are 
reciprocally influencing one another. See Frank Rudy Cooper, We Are Always Already 
Imprisoned: Hyper-Incarceration and Black Male Identity Performance, 93 B.U. L. REV. 
1185, 1195 (2013). 
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through all of those aspects of life and must ask, what are the 
elements of vulnerability itself? 
 In her article, The Vulnerable Subject and the Responsive State, 
Fineman identifies four key elements of vulnerability: universality, 
constancy, complexity, and particularity.94 The universality aspect of 
Fineman’s definition is based upon her seeing everyone as having the 
shared condition of being vulnerable. She says the following of the 
term “vulnerability”: “[M]y work has developed the concept of 
vulnerable detached from specific subgroups, using it to define the 
very meaning of what it means to be human.”95 The key to 
vulnerability theory, then, is that it conceives of vulnerability as a 
universal part of the human condition. While Fineman does not claim 
that vulnerability is the foundation of “what it means to be human,” it 
seems clear from her language that it is important to her that 
vulnerability be understood as shared by all.96 
A necessary assumption of universality as conceptualized in 
vulnerability theory is the idea that we can establish universals in the 
first place. Many would say that there is no “view from nowhere” that 
would allow us to understand “what it means to be human” under all 
circumstances.97 Fineman would say that, to the extent it is impossible 
to create a universal, we must construct one anyways because we are 
dealing with law. This is implied by her claim that “[w]hen we deal 
with the law . . . we employ a system dependent on the process of 
classification, generalization, and universal applicability.”98 For 
Fineman, this means “the most important task for those interested in 
a social justice project . . . is to construct a legal subject with which to 
replace the abstract liberal subject with its accompanying and 
unrealistic constructs of autonomy, self-sufficiency, and 
independence.”99 Those references to “universal applicability” and 
the “abstract liberal subject” demonstrate that vulnerability theory 
seeks to construct a universal subject. Since “the subject” is the 
thinker in the Cartesian model of “I think, therefore I am,” and 
subjectivity is “one’s awareness of oneself as a subject in the world,” 
vulnerability theory’s claim that there is a universal subject is a 
 
 94. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 268. 
 95. Id. at 266. 
 96. Id.  
 97. See generally THOMAS NAGEL, THE VIEW FROM NOWHERE (1986) (challenging 
ability to have purely objective perspective). 
 98. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 619–20. 
 99. Id. at 620. 
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significant assertion about personhood.100 As a claim about 
subjectivity, vulnerability theory is an attempt to create a vantage 
point from which we can see everyone as similar enough that we feel 
bound to one another. If we agreed that we are all vulnerable, maybe 
we could agree that we need a strong state to help us prevent injuries 
and recover from those that occur anyways. 
In addition to the universality of vulnerability, a second 
important aspect of vulnerability theory is the constancy of 
dependency on others. Fineman joins feminist critiques of the liberal 
subject’s supposed autonomy by contending that “the liberal subject 
is enmeshed in a web of relationships and . . . dependent upon 
them.”101 Vulnerability should be “understood as a state of constant 
possibility of harm” that “cannot be hidden.”102 Because vulnerability 
is constant, we are unavoidably dependent on each other and on the 
state. The element of constancy thus also sets up vulnerability 
theory’s argument for a strong state. 
The third prong of vulnerability theory is complexity. 
Vulnerability is complex because “it can manifest itself in multiple 
forms.”103 We could suffer simple physical harm, but that physical 
harm could itself create harms to our relationships.104 Those 
relationships could be with other people or with institutions.105 That 
second-level harm to relationships with others or with institutions 
could be economic or it could be social.106 Moreover, physical or other 
injuries to the individual could also result in intergenerational transfer 
of the consequences of injuries. As Fineman notes, the United States 
of America has among the very lowest rates of movement from the 
lower- to middle-classes of Western industrial nations.107 The reason 
for the calcification of social statuses relates to the way social 
groupings work in our society: 
[N]egative economic and institutional harms may cluster 
around members of a socially or culturally determined grouping 
who share certain societal positions or have suffered 
discrimination based on constructed categories used to 
 
 100. See Thomas A. King, A Few Thoughts About “Subjectivity,” MAPPING BRANDEIS 
PROJECT (Mar. 27, 2006), http://people.brandeis.edu/~mappingbrandeis/subjectivity.html 
(defining terms). 
 101. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 11. 
 102. Id. 
 103. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 268. 
 104. See id. (describing complexity of injuries). 
 105. See id. 
 106. See id. 
 107. See id. at 268 n.57 (describing lack of intergenerational mobility). 
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differentiate classes of persons, such as race, gender, ethnicity, 
or religious affiliation.108 
For vulnerability theorists, then, the existence of social groups is part 
of what makes the human condition complex. In turn, those social 
groupings are an additional source of vulnerability. The element of 
complexity is in tension with vulnerability theory’s post-identity 
approach, however, because it acknowledges that identities help 
create vulnerabilities. 
Vulnerability theory’s final element, the particularity of the 
human condition, is meant to explain complexity without reference to 
identities. According to vulnerability theory, we differ in our 
“embodiment” and in our social location “within webs of economic 
and institutional relationships.”109 Having a different phenotype or a 
different social status changes how we are treated. Thus, variation 
among humans means that we have particular experiences of 
vulnerability.110 
The first way in which particularity affects vulnerability is in 
embodied differences. That is, we are particularized by 
“physical/mental/intellectual and other variations . . . .”111 Fineman 
acknowledges that such variations “are not socially neutral, and 
historical reaction to some human variations, particularly race and 
gender, has led to the creation of hierarchies, discrimination, and 
even violence.”112 So, identities did matter at one point. Fineman goes 
on to insist, however, that continuing to use differences in 
embodiment to define who is vulnerable “obscures the reality of 
universal vulnerability” and “stigmatizes” those groups.113 So, we 
should respond to embodied particularity by emphasizing our 
overarching shared human condition of vulnerability. 
The second way that particularity affects vulnerability in 
Fineman’s analysis is through social location. She says that our 
differential locations within relationships with other people and 
institutions “structure our options and create opportunities.”114 Social 
location is so important because institutions provide us with access to 
resources for addressing our vulnerabilities.115 Those resources might 
 
 108. Id. at 268. 
 109. Id. at 269. 
 110. Id.  
 111. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 637. 
 112. Id.  
 113. Id. 
 114. Id. at 638.  
 115. Id.  
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be child care or food or unemployment insurance. But if our 
relationship to our family or local businesses or the government is 
fractured, we cannot access those resources. Because social location is 
key to acquisition of the resources to address vulnerabilities, 
vulnerability theorists suggest that identities are not especially 
important. Such a conception fits with Fineman’s pervasive 
description of phenomena that could be explained as rooted in 
identities as instead rooted in institutional arrangements.116 
Vulnerability theory’s goal in rejecting identities is laudable: 
connecting vulnerability to a greater responsibility for society to 
configure institutional arrangements so that they will prevent and 
ameliorate injuries.117 Again, then, vulnerability theory helps justify a 
strong state. 
Together, Fineman’s elements of vulnerability theory describe a 
universal human condition and how it varies. Overall, the elements 
create a post-identity way of seeking social progress. What the 
elements leave somewhat open is the means of accomplishing that 
goal. In the next section, I will briefly describe the implications of 
vulnerability theory as the means of seeking social progress. 
B. Implications of Vulnerability Theory 
If we accept vulnerability theory, we are led to two principal 
conclusions. First, it seems that vulnerability theory would have us 
reject identities. In The Vulnerable Subject, Fineman explicitly claims 
that the current understanding of suspect classifications under the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s equal protection clause “define[s] 
individual legal identities . . . .”118 Fineman also takes “[t]his system of 
identity categories” to “define[] the organization of interest 
groups.”119 Relating her theory that individuals are better defined as 
positioned by systems of power than by identity theory’s concept of 
intersectionality,120 Fineman states as follows: 
 
 116. See generally Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9 (calling for dumping 
identities from equal protection analysis); Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9 
(criticizing multidimensional masculinities theory). 
 117. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 639. 
 118. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 2–3. 
 119. Id. at 3. 
 120. Intersectionality is the concept that when two or more categories of identity 
intersect, the identity formed there is unique. So, the identity “black woman” is not 
reducible to the addition of a lowest common denominator experience of women and 
blacks in general. See, e.g., Kimberlé Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins: Intersectionality, 
Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1243–44 
(1991) (coining the term “intersectionality”); Angela P. Harris, Race and Essentialism in 
Feminist Legal Theory, 42 STAN. L. REV. 581, 588 (1990) (identifying essentialism in 
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[W]ith respect to the assets any one person possesses, it is not 
multiple identities that intersect to produce compounded 
inequalities, . . . but rather systems of power and privilege that 
interact to produce webs of advantages and disadvantages. 
Thus, . . . a vulnerability analysis provides a means of 
interrogating the institutional practices that produce the 
identities and inequalities in the first place.121 
The heart of this quote is that systems of “power,” by which Fineman 
seems to mean wealth and control of institutions rather than 
“privilege,” as I use the term, position people more than systems of 
identity do so.122 I see Fineman’s contrasting of power and identities 
as resting on two propositions. First, “systems of power” are distinct 
from systems of identities. Preeminent feminist theorist Martha 
Chamallas refers to vulnerability theory as part of a movement 
toward “feminism without feminism” because of its post-identity 
stance.123 In this sense, identities are simply irrelevant to the broader 
progressive goal of making society less influenced by hierarchical 
power relations. A second proposition is that systems of power affect 
a person’s resources for addressing vulnerabilities more than do 
identities. Vulnerability theory thus prioritizes analysis of power over 
analysis of identities. As I will discuss in the next Part of this Article, I 
reject the propositions that identities are irrelevant or subsumed by 
generalized analysis of power relations based on the fact that 
identities are materially crucial. 
The second key implication of vulnerability theory is that it is the 
best way to justify a strong government (state). Vulnerability theory’s 
overall goal is to foster “resilience.”124 Resilience is the ability to 
bounce back from injury.125 Vulnerability theory’s primary method of 
fostering resilience is to promote a responsive state.126 A responsive 
 
feminist legal theory). For more information on intersectionality, see generally CRITICAL 
RACE FEMINISM: A READER (Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2003). 
 121. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 16 (citations omitted). 
 122. See id. Fineman is not using the word “privilege” in the way that I advocate, for 
she does not cite its major explicators, Peggy McIntosh and Stephanie Wildman, nor the 
related literature. See id. 
 123. MARTHA CHAMALLAS, INTRODUCTION TO FEMINIST LEGAL THEORY 137 (3d 
ed. 2012); see also Marc Spindelman, Feminism Without Feminism, 9 ISSUES LEGAL 
SCHOLARSHIP, art. 8 (2011) (coining term). 
 124. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 269; Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, 
supra note 9, at 13.  
 125. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 270. 
 126. Id. at 273–74 (explaining the responsiveness of state institutions is under suspicion 
in American society for fear of interference with entrenched ideals of autonomy and 
liberty).  
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state provides and supports the institutions that help create resiliency 
in the face of vulnerabilities.127 It does so by continuously monitoring, 
evaluating, updating, and reforming its institutions. The focus should 
be on the state’s responsibility to its citizens in assuring the equality 
of opportunity, treatment, and access to resources that would allow 
individuals to be resilient.128 Such constant reevaluation of state 
institutions to ensure equal opportunity and access is necessary 
because institutions, like humans, are vulnerable to harm, here in the 
form of corruption of institutions such that they do not provide 
everyone with equality of opportunity.129 For instance, the recent 
Department of Justice report on the Ferguson, Missouri Police 
Department demonstrates how institutions are vulnerable to 
corruption.130 Vulnerability theory’s solution would seem to require 
institutions to constantly monitor themselves and be externally 
monitored to make sure they are fully serving all of the people. In 
Ferguson, Missouri, vulnerability theory would help explain the need 
for long-term federal monitoring. 
Vulnerability theory’s means of enforcing a responsive state is to 
create an equal protection claim that requires the state to 
affirmatively create equality of opportunity. This is a substantive 
 
 127. Id. at 274. 
 128. For instance, Fineman’s version of equal protection doctrine starts from the 
premise that the state must treat everyone equally as well unless the state carries its 
burden of justification for a deviation. See MATTHEW C. R. CRAVEN, THE 
INTERNATIONAL COVENANT ON ECONOMIC, SOCIAL, AND CULTURAL RIGHTS 154–55 
(1995); Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 2. She wants our constitutional and 
statutory antidiscrimination laws to reach the “combined workings of the economic, 
political, cultural, and social systems.” Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1736 
n.99. As Fineman acknowledges, the Fourteenth Amendment had the potential to 
guarantee substantive equality. See id. at 1726. The fault for the demise of substantive 
equality seems to lie at the feet of conservative politicians and judges going back to the 
1970s (and earlier), though, not identities theorists. See, e.g., Washington v. Davis, 426 
U.S. 229, 239 (1976) (rejecting societal discrimination as a basis for affirmative action). For 
example, political historian Jeremy Mayer reveals that political conservatives made 
fighting racial progress the secret core of their agenda from Goldwater through Reagan. 
See JEREMY D. MAYER, RUNNING ON RACE: RACIAL POLITICS IN PRESIDENTIAL 
CAMPAIGNS, 1960–2000, at 293 (2002). I would like to see Fineman more clearly 
acknowledge that conservatives ruined equal protection doctrine, not identities theorists.  
 129. Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1716 (contending that events such as 
market fluctuations, changing international policies, institutional and political 
compromises, and prejudices harm institutions and that those in control often hide 
institutional vulnerabilities). 
 130. See generally, CIVIL RIGHTS DIV., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, INVESTIGATION OF 
THE FERGUSON POLICE DEPARTMENT (2015), available at http://www.justice.gov/sites/ 
default/files/opa/pressreleases/attachments/2015/03/04/ferguson_police_department_report
.pdf (criticizing Ferguson, Missouri Police Department for pattern and practice of racially 
discriminatory policing). 
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equality. In contrast, the current formal equality approach to equal 
protection is based on an extreme version of the Lockean conception 
of individuals as autonomous.131 As to equality, conservative 
jurisprudence guarantees only a negative right not to be treated 
differently when the discrimination is explicitly based on specified 
prohibited grounds.132 Substantive equality would start from the 
premise that the state must treat everyone equally as well unless the 
state carries its burden of justification for a deviation.133 Borrowing 
from Vermont’s state constitutional jurisprudence, Fineman’s version 
of substantive equality would establish “a positive right to access the 
social goods or resources necessary to sustain equally valued 
individuals.”134 Vulnerability theory’s substantive equality approach 
would thus reach the “combined workings of the economic, political, 
cultural, and social systems.”135 I am on board with vulnerability 
theory’s acknowledgement of everyone’s interdependence and call for 
a substantively responsive state but believe it will not fulfill its 
promise unless it is responsive to the effects of identities. The next 
Part more fully explains why I believe vulnerability theory must 
grapple with identities.  
III.  CRITIQUING VULNERABILITY THEORY 
My criticisms of vulnerability theory’s rejection of identities 
revolve around this insight: when it comes to men of color, we are 
always already suspect.136 Even if we accept vulnerability theory’s 
description of particularity as a matter of embodiment, men of color 
are distinguishable from the universal human condition based on our 
 
 131. See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 2.  
 132. See, e.g., CRAVEN, supra note 128, at 154–55; Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra 
note 9, at 2.  
 133. See CRAVEN, supra note 128, at 154–55; Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 
9, at 2.  
 134. Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1718–19. Fineman particularly lauds 
the Vermont doctrine requiring equal treatment, which she sees as requiring that social 
success derives only from “differences of capacity, disposition, and virtue, rather than 
governmental favor or privilege.” Id. at 1729–30 (citations omitted). Vermont’s doctrine 
specifically prohibits “the conferral of advantages or emoluments upon the privileged.” Id. 
at 1730 (citations omitted). Fineman does not emphasize the wrongness of the status of 
being privileged; she is most concerned with the wrongness of the state conferring benefits 
on some but not others. See id. Because I see privilege as systematically conferred by 
social norms, especially through understandings about the meanings of identities, my 
emphasis is different. 
 135. Id. at 1736 n.99.  
 136. See LOUIS ALTHUSSER, ON THE REPRODUCTION OF CAPITALISM: IDEOLOGY 
AND IDEOLOGICAL STATE APPARATUSES 265 (G.M. Goshgarian trans., 2014) (referring 
to “always already” being subjected to, and made a subject by, ideology). 
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racial phenotype and gender. The “historical reaction”137 to our 
particular intersection of race and gender, which is different than 
historical reactions to black women and white men, is an ongoing 
social fact.138 And, at least in the context of policing, it is significantly 
worse than the reaction to other individuals.  
In vulnerability theory’s other way of describing particularity, 
our social location is that of permanent outsider. We are not just 
temporarily defined as culturally inferior and dangerous. As Fineman 
acknowledges, “Individuals who have certain characteristics have 
been subordinated and excluded from the benefits of society, often 
because their differences are thought to indicate they are dangerous, 
or interpreted as inadequacy, inferiority or weakness.”139 In this 
society, young, urban, black or Latino males are the symbol of 
dangerousness beyond all others.140 
Vulnerability theory does not work for analysis of racial profiling 
because the always already suspect status of young black males is 
unlikely to change in the near future. As Angela Harris has described, 
because the United States of America has been founded upon the 
subordination of blacks in general, there is an “African-American 
exception[]” to the usual “melting . . . pot” narrative that social 
groups are quarantined for a while and then allowed into the 
mainstream.141 Harris contrasts the former negative treatment of 
white ethnics with ongoing subordination of blacks under the rubric 
of “black exceptionalism.”142 I take the concept of black 
exceptionalism to mean that progress for white ethnics, and even 
Asians or Latinas/os, may not be extended to blacks. This conflicts 
with Fineman’s belief that neither privilege nor advantage is tied to 
identities.143 But identification of young men of color as suspicious is 
so pervasive as to make identities, not a universalizable vulnerability, 
 
 137. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 637. 
 138. See generally Cooper, supra note 1 (discussing uniqueness of black male attributed 
identity).  
 139. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 637.  
 140. See generally VICTOR M. RIOS, PUNISHED: POLICING THE LIVES OF BLACK AND 
LATINO BOYS (2011) (studying police treatment of black and Latino boys in Oakland).  
 141. Cf. Leslie Espinoza & Angela P. Harris, Afterword: Embracing the Tar-Baby—
LatCrit Theory and the Sticky Mess of Race, 85 CALIF. L. REV. 1585, 1596 (1997) 
(conversing about ways in which the black-white binary paradigm of race is productive 
and unproductive). For an excellent festschrift on Angela Harris’s work, see generally 
Camille Gear Rich, Angela Harris and the Racial Politics of Masculinity: Trayvon Martin, 
George Zimmerman, and the Dilemmas of Desiring Whiteness, 102 CALIF. L. REV. 1027 
(2014).  
 142. Espinoza & Harris, supra note 141, at 1596.  
 143. See Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 17. 
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foundational to their subjectivity.144 Because of racial profiling, young 
black men are vulnerable in a special way. This fact presents a serious 
challenge to vulnerability theory’s insistence on a universal human 
condition. 
While I admire vulnerability theory’s utopian, “people are 
people” mentality, I fear that its universal approach masks real 
differences amongst people. In section A, I argue that vulnerability 
theory’s universal approach hides the continuing existence of 
particular experiences based on identities. In section B, I then discuss 
how identities are merely socially constructed but remain materially 
crucial. In section C, I briefly consider a potential objection to my 
critique. 
A. Universals Hide Particularity 
Vulnerability theory necessarily assumes that there can be a 
standard version of personhood.145 Based on the teaching of critical 
theory, and especially critical race theory, I argue that there is no 
universal that does not in fact hide an intrinsic particularity.146 The 
legal realists had already debunked the idea that law could be neutral 
enough to describe a universal perspective.147 Critical race theorists 
further contend that the particularity that is smuggled back into the 
universal is likely to be the same norms we traditionally have seen in 
the West. For example, in the West, the “universal” perspective has 
been based on the experiences and viewpoints most common to 
straight, white, able-bodied Christian men who are economically 
advantaged.148 That means the universal description of the human 
condition has really been a particularity making a claim to 
universality. Accordingly, Iris Marion Young has described a “scaling 
 
 144. On the black-male-as-criminal stereotype, see, for example, Jerry Kang, Trojan 
Horses of Race, 118 HARV. L. REV. 1489, 1492 (2005) (summarizing research showing 
black males associated with criminality); Kenneth B. Nunn, Race, Crime and the Pool of 
Surplus Criminality: Or Why the “War on Drugs” Was a “War on Blacks”, 6 J. GENDER 
RACE & JUST. 381, 381 n.1 (2002) (discussing how the drug war exploited and reinforced 
stereotype of black criminality). 
 145. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 619–20 (referring to model’s 
“universal applicability”).  
 146. See generally Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE THEORY: THE KEY WRITINGS 
THAT FORMED THE MOVEMENT, at xiii–xxxii (Kimberlé Crenshaw et al. eds., 1995) 
(describing and extending Critical Legal Studies’ critique of objectivity).  
 147. Gary Minda, The Jurisprudential Movements of the 1980s, 50 OHIO ST. L.J. 599, 
633–35 (1989) (summarizing uses of Legal Realism).  
 148. See IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF DIFFERENCE 126–28 
(1990) (describing Western epistemology as rooted in a “scaling of bodies”); Cooper, 
supra note 1, at 870–73.  
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of bodies” in Western culture whereby attributes are hierarchized.149 
Race is hierarchized as white over black, gender as male over female, 
religion as Christian over “infidel,” and so on.150 Because the scaling 
of bodies is built into Western culture, accepting Western culture’s 
invitation to generalize into a universal is likely to implicitly accept 
the scaling of bodies. 
The ultimate problem with universals is that we have a race, a 
gender, a sexual orientation, and a class status whether we choose to 
acknowledge all of those statuses or not.151 For instance, as Barbara 
Flagg has pointed out, whites have tended to think of themselves as 
having no racial identity.152 Blacks, Asians, and Latinas/os have not 
been afforded that luxury.153 Moreover, whites do not actually lack 
racial identity. Their whiteness is simply “transparent” in that the 
experiences and viewpoints shared by most whites, or at least whites 
in power, are presumed to be normal and norm-setting.154 These white 
norms thus serve as the background principles for reasonability and 
objectivity. So, when we assume that “people are people,” we end up 
installing a particular group’s experiences and worldview as an 
objective vantage point. That is a crucial reason that we cannot 
replace identities theory with an assumption of a universal 
vulnerability. 
Criminal procedure provides an example of the problem with 
generalizing. Scholars in the field have long debated the utility of 
generalizing and concluded that rigid, bright-line rules must bear a 
strong resemblance to reality. For example, the search incident to 
arrest rule says that police may search the area within the “immediate 
control” of the suspect when they have probable cause to arrest 
him.155 The Court used to generalize this rule by presuming that the 
passenger compartment of a car is within the immediate control of the 
 
 149. See supra note 148. 
 150. See YOUNG, supra note 148, at 126–28 (defining scaling of bodies).  
 151. See, e.g., BARBARA J. FLAGG, WAS BLIND, BUT NOW I SEE: WHITE RACE 
CONSCIOUSNESS & THE LAW 1 (1998) (defining “the [white] transparency phenomenon”); 
see also Barbara J. Flagg, “Was Blind but Now I See”: White Race Consciousness and the 
Requirement of Discriminatory Intent, 91 MICH. L. REV. 953, 957, 977–78 (1993) (defining 
“the [white] transparency phenomenon”).  
 152. See Flagg, supra note 151, at 957.  
 153. See, e.g., Espinoza & Harris, supra note 141, at 1603–04 (discussing theory of black 
exceptionalism). 
 154. See Flagg, supra note 151, at 970 (describing how whiteness becomes transparent).  
 155.  See Chimel v. California, 395 U.S. 752, 763 (1969). I use “universal pronoun” 
(male pronoun) because the vast majority of criminal suspects are men. If you noticed its 
genderization, you may not be in favor of universals.  
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suspect when he is stopped in a car.156 This rule reached its breaking 
point when the Court acknowledged that police officers almost always 
lock the arrestee in a police cruiser before conducting a search of his 
car.157 The Court thus moved away from its generalization and created 
a new rule requiring that the suspect either actually have the 
passenger compartment within his immediate control or be subjected 
to a special exception.158 So generalization is not an inevitable rule of 
legal method. Nor should it be a rule of subjectivity. 
Vulnerability theory seems to acknowledge that its 
generalizations about the human condition will not always reflect 
reality. Fineman admits that attempting to change law through her 
vulnerability lens “may overlook some differences among people in 
the interests of furthering reforms to benefit the larger group.”159 I 
ask: Whose interests will be overlooked? Who will choose the nature 
of the common goals? Unfortunately, the minority’s interests are the 
ones that are usually overlooked and the majority is usually the group 
that chooses the supposedly common goals.  
B. Identities Are Socially Constructed but Materially Crucial 
Meanwhile, the problem with subsuming identities under 
vulnerability theory’s principles of complexity and particularity is that 
we are not all vulnerable in the same ways or even to the same 
degrees. To say that we are all united by vulnerability is to say that, at 
rock bottom, we are all the same. That is true in an abstract sense but 
not in reality. If all we had was what unites us, we could never identify 
ourselves as unique and particular individuals. We are all human, but 
we are different types of humans. The differentiation of humans into 
social groupings provides us with a key, perhaps even inescapable, 
way of coming to understand ourselves. I am not saying that we have 
to identify ourselves solely based on race and gender body types. 
Nonetheless, to say, “I am human” is to say very little when talking to 
another human. To say, “I am from the United States of America” to 
a nonresident of the United States, or, “I am a northerner” to 
 
 156. See New York v. Belton, 453 U.S. 454, 463 (1981), overruled by Arizona v. Gant, 
556 U.S. 332 (2009) (allowing per se search incident to arrest of passenger compartment of 
car). 
 157. See Thorton v. United States, 541 U.S. 615, 627 (2004) (Scalia, J., concurring); see 
also Edwin J. Butterfoss, Bright Line Breaking Point: Embracing Justice Scalia’s Call for 
the Supreme Court to Abandon an Unreasonable Approach to Fourth Amendment Search 
and Seizure Law, 82 TUL. L. REV. 77, 110 (2007) (arguing for the approach to Belton 
advocated by Justice Scalia in Thorton).  
 158. See Arizona v. Gant, 556 U.S. 332, 350 (2009) (overturning Belton).  
 159. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 634. 
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someone from the southern United States, or, “I am black,” or, “I am 
male,” or, “I am straight” to my interlocutor, assuming they cannot 
tell that I am these things, starts to separate me from the mass of 
humanity. While I cannot gainsay vulnerability’s claim that law 
operates through processes of classification and generalization,160 I 
wonder, do those generalizations not have to be roughly accurate? 
Since it is inevitable that I must sometimes distinguish myself as from 
the United States, the North, and so on, we ought to recognize that 
fact by refusing to pretend that there is a universal human condition 
that does not have to be differentiated in practice. 
With this insight in mind, I want to return to the first implication 
of vulnerability theory: its claim that “systems of power” subsume 
identities. Vulnerability theory’s propositions that systems of power 
are distinct from identities and that they affect people more than 
identities are nothing short of a rejection of the central insight of 
critical race feminists. For us, the fundamental social system is that we 
are born into a world that positions us within a web of categories of 
identity.161 Moreover, the intersection of categories of identities, such 
as black and female, creates a unique identity that is not generalizable 
to the lowest common denominator of the two categories.162 So, a 
black woman should not have her interests lumped in with those of all 
blacks, or all women, or all humans. As a consequence, both of 
vulnerability theory’s propositions about identities are wrong because 
identities are co-constituted with, and thus inextricable from, systems 
of power. 
We can demonstrate another problem at the heart of 
vulnerabilities theory by debunking its notion of identity formation. 
For instance, Fineman claims that “institutional practices . . . produce 
the identities and inequalities in the first place.”163 At best, Fineman’s 
claim is only partially right. Identities and institutional practices are 
co-constituted in that they reciprocally influence one another.164 To 
say that identities and institutional practices are co-constituted is to 
 
 160. See id. at 619–20 (defending universality). 
 161. See generally PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, FIGHTING WORDS: BLACK WOMEN AND 
THE SEARCH FOR JUSTICE 7 (1998) (arguing black women’s positionality affects their 
subjectivity).  
 162. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction, in CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM: A 
READER, supra note 120, at 1, 1–18 (discussing women of color’s unique positionality). 
 163. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 16. 
 164. Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Introduction: Masculinities, 
Multidimensionality, and Law: Why They Need One Another, in MASCULINITIES AND THE 
LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH 1, 11 (Frank Rudy Cooper & Ann C. McGinley 
eds., 2012). 
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say that they are imbricated in one another. People form their 
identities based in part on their interactions with institutions, but at 
the same time, institutions operate only through the actions of 
individuals who themselves have pre-formed senses of the meanings 
of their own and others’ identities. That means that identity formation 
precedes, but is also simultaneously influenced by, institutional 
practices. 
Moreover, identities are both unreal in that they are socially 
constructed and also materially crucial. If all Fineman’s critique 
means is that we are all human, it would be hard to disagree with her. 
That would imply that identities such as race are not “real,” but 
socially constructed. As a critical race theorist, I subscribe to the 
theory of social construction. Identities are “formed” by social 
conditions rather than derived directly from nature.165 There is 
nothing more to race than our interpretation of certain bodily 
characteristics as constituting a “race,” which we then take to connote 
certain personality traits. It is nurture, not nature that creates 
identities.166 As a biological matter, there is no such thing as race: we 
are all human. And this point has been made with respect to other 
identities.167 Vulnerability theory thus seems to suffer from what 
critical race theorist Kimberlé Crenshaw calls “vulgar 
constructionism.”168 This is the fallacy that because identities are not 
real in the biological sense, we should not organize around them.169 
The remaining problem is that, in the social world, identities are 
very much real. That is, identities are socially constructed but 
materially consequential.170 For example, pretending I am human and 
not a black male could get me shot by the police. Numerous sources 
have reported about the tradition of black parents warning their black 
boys not to try to seek equal treatment from the police, lest they be 
shot.171 The “don’t get yourself shot” talk that parents must have with 
 
 165. MICHAEL OMI & HOWARD WINANT, RACIAL FORMATION IN THE UNITED 
STATES 105–15 (3d ed. 2015) (explicating racial formation theory). 
 166. See generally JUDITH BUTLER, GENDER TROUBLE: FEMINISM AND THE 
SUBVERSION OF IDENTITY 12 (1999) (classically stating that “there is no recourse to a 
body that has not always already been interpreted by cultural meanings”).  
 167. Judith Butler, Restaging the Universal: Hegemony and the Limits of Formalism, in 
CONTINGENCY, HEGEMONY, UNIVERSALITY: CONTEMPORARY DIALOGUES ON THE 
LEFT 11, 29 (Judith Butler, Ernesto Laclau & Slavoj Žižek eds., 2000).  
 168. Crenshaw, supra note 120, at 386 n.75 (defining vulgar constructionism). 
 169. Id. 
 170. Frank Rudy Cooper, Our First Unisex President?: Black Masculinity and Obama’s 
Feminine Side, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 633, 643 (2009). 
 171. See James H. Burnett III, After Trayvon Martin, It’s Time for “The Talk,” 
BOSTON.COM (Apr. 7, 2012), http://www.boston.com/news/local/massachusetts/articles/ 
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black boys is a powerful symbol of the material consequences of 
identities. 
As a matter of biology, we are all human, but as a matter of our 
social lives, we have identities. If vulnerability theory is suggesting 
that just because identities are socially constructed, we can get outside 
of them, it is mistaken. Accordingly, vulnerability theory is wrong 
when it implicitly suggests that the constructedness of identities 
makes them unimportant in relation to our shared human condition 
of being vulnerable. In sum, identities continue to matter and they are 
not sufficiently recognized in vulnerability theory as presently 
constructed.  
C. Reconsidering Elements of Vulnerability Theory 
This section applies the critiques of vulnerability theory as 
creating a false universal and neglecting the material consequences of 
identities by reconsidering Fineman’s four elements of the theory. 
The subsections thus review vulnerability theory’s principles of 
universality, constancy, complexity, and particularity. The last 
subsection argues there is an element missing from vulnerability 
theory: privilege. 
1.  Universality 
Law may be “dependent on the process of classification, 
generalization, and universal applicability,” but that dependence has 
always been false and, accordingly, our imagination of a better world 
should not be limited to universals.172 As I discussed in Part III.A of 
this Article, the critical race theory movement has debunked the idea 
that there can be an objective and universal perspective. Given that 
fact, law’s call for universality should not be answered. We should not 
set up false equivalences between all types of people. Black men are 
always already suspect, which is simply different than being a white 
male who encounters the police. Consequently, we should revise 
universality out of vulnerability theory.  
Having said universality is impossible, I believe that we are all 
vulnerable and that this theory does the best job of elaborating the 
ways that is so. The key is that vulnerability reveals our 
interdependence and thus provides a reason for coalition-building. 
 
2012/04/07/in_light_of_trayvon_martin_case_black_fathers_in_boston_are_scrambling_to_
have_safety_talk_with_sons/ (discussing ritual of parents telling black boys that police may 
shoot them). 
 172. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 619–20. 
CITE AS 93 N.C. L. REV. 1339 (2015) 
2015] ALWAYS ALREADY SUSPECT 1371 
While there is a shared human condition of being vulnerable, 
however, people remain differentially privileged. We should not refer 
to one universal human condition but to the fact that people are 
universally vulnerable. 
2.  Constancy 
Recognizing the constancy of vulnerability seems much less 
problematic than referring to a singular human condition. While we 
are not all the same, our shared condition of vulnerability does 
provide a basis for solidarity. Since we cannot escape our inevitable 
dependency, we might as well band together to fight for a strong 
state. The exemplary illustration of privilege that I will relate in Part 
IV.A will help demonstrate what we already know: The privileged 
and the disadvantaged are both harmed by the game of seeking to 
accumulate more wealth than the next person. Helping those of us 
with privileged statuses to recognize that the game of trying to be as 
rich as possible harms them as well would encourage coalition 
politics.173 The privileged will be made more likely to join coalitions if 
they are shown that being vulnerable is a constant of the human 
condition. 
3.  Complexity 
I agree that vulnerability is complex. There are myriad ways that 
we could be physically, mentally, relationally, institutionally, or 
otherwise harmed.174 And those harms can interact with one another 
to exacerbate our vulnerabilities. 
Nonetheless, the element of complexity requires a major 
revision. Vulnerability theory needs to acknowledge that, because of 
the scaling of bodies, vulnerabilities have and will continue to be 
structured around identities. This was the lesson of Part III.B, which 
showed how identities are materially crucial. Moreover, the 
structuring of vulnerabilities around identities is far from past. The 
literature on implicit bias amply demonstrates that the scaling of 
bodies continues to have an afterlife.175 Fineman is right that 
 
 173. As the movie Sweet Bird of Youth puts it, “Anyone can be a millionaire, so 
everybody’s got to try it.” See Sweet Bird of Youth, SUBZIN, http://www.subzin.com/ 
quotes/M4203b905/Sweet+Bird+of+Youth/Anyone+can+be+a+millionaire%2C+so+every
body%27s+got+to+try+it (last visited Feb. 15, 2015).  
 174. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 268. 
 175. See BANAJI & GREENWALD, supra note 18, at 46 (explicating implicit bias); 
YOUNG, supra note 148, at 128–30 (explicating the scaling of bodies). 
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categories of identity are merely “constructed”176 but underestimates 
the way they continue to have material consequences. Consequently, 
the most important revision of vulnerability theory will be the 
incorporation of identities theories as an explanation for many forms 
of vulnerability.177 
4.  Particularity 
As with the complexity of vulnerability, the particularity of 
vulnerability seems to necessitate identities analysis. Again, 
particularity has and will continue to be defined largely by identities. 
The significance of the “embodiment” of vulnerabilities stems from 
the past and present practice of attaching meanings to particular 
forms of embodiment.178 The use of identities to oppress is not just a 
“historical reaction”;179 it is built into Western epistemology in the 
form of the scaling of bodies.180 Furthermore, the “stigma” that 
attends to holding onto identity groupings stems from the majority’s 
reaction to minority status, especially when it comes to race.181 Worse 
yet, paralleling a Justice Kennedy-esque antibalkanization rationale 
for attacking affirmative action and equal protection laws,182 which 
Fineman clearly does not intend to do,183 risks blaming the victims of 
the scaling of bodies for their own oppression,184 which Fineman 
surely does not intend to do. Meanwhile, contrasting multiple 
identities with “systems of power”185 does not hold up, for identities 
have themselves been a means of distributing resources that cut 
across social institutions.  
 
 176. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 268. 
 177. Here, Nancy E. Dowd, Nancy Levit, and Ann C. McGinley’s use of “complexity 
theory” in order to build a feminist approach to masculinities could be helpful. See, e.g., 
Nancy E. Dowd et al., Feminist Legal Theory Meets Masculinities Theory, in 
MASCULINITIES AND THE LAW: A MULTIDIMENSIONAL APPROACH, supra note 164, at 
25, 26–27, 46. 
 178. Fineman, Responsive State, supra note 9, at 269 (discussing embodiment).  
 179. Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 637. 
 180. See YOUNG, supra note 148, at 128–30 (defining scaling of bodies). 
 181. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 637 (arguing identities 
stigmatize their holders). 
 182. See Ricci v. DeStefano, 557 U.S. 557, 561–63 (2009) (holding that discarding a fire 
fighter test that had a negative disparate impact on racial minorities violated the equal 
protection rights of whites); Parents Involved in Cmty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 
U.S. 701, 787 (2007) (Kennedy, J., concurring in part and concurring in the judgment) 
(“The enduring hope is that race should not matter; the reality is that too often it does.”). 
 183. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1754–55 (supporting affirmative 
action).  
 184. See generally WILLIAM RYAN, BLAMING THE VICTIM (1971) (defining and 
explaining this term).  
 185. Fineman, Vulnerable Subject, supra note 9, at 16. 
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5.  A Missing Element: Privilege 
Review of Fineman’s elements of vulnerability theory calls for a 
revision of vulnerability theory that includes identities as an aspect of 
complexity and particularity. The way to accomplish that goal is by 
incorporating a theory of privilege. Again, a privilege is an unearned 
asset automatically conferred by the operation of social norms that 
favor your identity. The benefits of a privilege are often invisible, 
even to their holders. Analysis of privilege will fit well within 
vulnerability theory because vulnerability theory focuses on burdens. 
Adding analysis of privilege will better allow us to talk about who is 
benefitted by social norms. The revised vulnerability theory will then 
be able to explain how systems of power both benefit some identities 
and make others more vulnerable. Accordingly, the next Part 
advances the revision of vulnerability theory by further explicating 
the theory of privilege. 
 
D. Potential Objection to Revising Vulnerability Theory 
Before moving on, I want to acknowledge that my critique of 
vulnerability theory is subject to objections. For instance, my 
challenge to vulnerability theory may hit the theory where it is 
weakest and therefore not adequately represent its value. Certainly 
there is something to this. After all, vulnerability theory seems 
especially valuable for discussing disabilities.186 Yet, I argue, it fails to 
adequately remedy racial profiling. Here the terms of the theory 
imply its own critique. Vulnerability theory is a total theory, at least 
in the sense that it seeks to explain all of antidiscrimination law and 
propounds a general approach to the state. Such a theory cannot 
leave out as important an issue as racial profiling without calling itself 
into question. The theory of privilege will help us account for racial 
profiling within the vulnerabilities framework. 
IV. PROPOSAL: REVISE VULNERABILITY THEORY SO THAT IT 
ACKNOWLEDGES RELATIVE PRIVILEGE 
Nathan W. Pyle describes a great illustration of the concept of 
privilege. He saw a high school teacher lead the following exercise. 
 
 186. See, e.g., Kate Kaul, Vunerability, for Example: Disability Theory as Extraordinary 
Demand, 25 CANADIAN J. WOMEN & L. 81, 97 (2013) (applying vulnerability theory to 
disabilities); Ani B. Satz, Disability, Vulnerability, and the Limits of Antidiscrimination, 83 
WASH. L. REV. 513, 523 (2008) (considering vulnerability theory’s application to 
disability).  
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The students were sitting in rows of desks in a standard classroom. 
The teacher gave each student a crumpled piece of paper and then 
placed a waste basket in the front of the room. He informed the class 
that they represented residents of the United States who wished to 
move up to the highest class of wealth. Students who successfully 
threw their crumpled paper into the basket from their seat would be 
deemed to have moved into the upper class. The students in the back 
of the room complained that the exercise was not fair, as they had to 
throw their paper balls further than those who were seated in the 
front of the class. Students in the front of the class were satisfied with 
the rules. The students then took their shots. Most of those in the 
front of the room made it, but not all of them. Most of those in the 
back of the room did not make it, but some did. The teacher then 
acknowledged that those in front had a much better shot of making it 
than did those in the back. The teacher also noted that only those in 
the back complained about fairness; those in the front concentrated 
on their goal and did not notice the unfairness built into the game.187 
In this Part of the Article, I add a new element to vulnerability 
theory: consideration of how people are differentially privileged. 
Section A defines privilege and discusses how its acknowledgement 
will alter vulnerability theory. Section B discusses what a revised 
vulnerability theory would look like. Section C briefly suggests how a 
revised vulnerability theory could be used to justify a federal mandate 
to overhaul policing throughout the country. 
A. Incorporating Analysis of Privilege into Vulnerability Theory 
The metaphor of the privilege game from Pyle’s example is 
pretty straightforward: some people have built-in advantages in our 
supposed meritocracy. We know, for instance, that being born to rich, 
highly educated parents advantages you.188 We know as well that 
women, as a group, face “built-in headwinds”189 against their success 
 
 187. Nathan W. Pyle, This Teacher Taught His Class a Powerful Lesson About 
Privilege with a Recycling Bin and Some Scrap Paper, BUZZFEED (Nov. 21, 2014), 
http://www.buzzfeed.com/nathanwpyle/this-teacher-taught-his-class-a-powerful-lesson-
about-privil#.jxywo42xJW. 
 188. See Matt Bruenig, What’s More Important: A College Degree or Being Born Rich?, 
MATT BRUENIG POL. (June 13, 2013), http://mattbruenig.com/2013/06/13/whats-more-
important-a-college-degree-or-being-born-rich/ (analyzing tables from Pew Economic 
Mobility Project describing chances of changing class status); see also Fineman, Responsive 
State, supra note 9, at 268 n.57 (describing lack of intergenerational mobility).  
 189. Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424, 432 (1971) (discussing use of 
employment tests to prevent racial minorities from being hired). 
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in business.190 Finally, as I noted in Part I.A of this Article, we know 
that racial minorities face implicit bias in a wide array of social 
sectors. 
The theory of privilege also shows that identities are crucial to 
the maintenance of hierarchy. Hence, we tend to uncritically accept 
labeling racial minority students who achieve as “acting white,”191 
women who demonstrate strong leadership as “masculine,”192 and 
conventional gays and lesbians as “straight-acting.”193 In each case, 
our common sense way of thinking makes the privileged status the 
norm for behavior. Having an identity that is normative automatically 
benefits its holders.194 As I described in Part III.B, racial privilege 
operates both because the scaling of bodies assigns negative value to 
non-white status195 and because the white transparency effect makes 
experiences and viewpoints most common to whites the invisible 
norm.196 Consequently, the scaling of bodies assigns whites to the 
figurative front of the class and blacks and Latinas/os to the figurative 
back of the class. The scaling of bodies and the invisibility of norms 
also affects women, sexual minorities, and so on. Identities, therefore, 
are a principal means by which privilege is maintained in this society. 
If it is to create a better society for all, vulnerability theory will have 
to acknowledge that identity groups are differentially privileged. 
 
 190. See generally, e.g., JOAN C. WILLIAMS & VETA T. RICHARDSON, NEW 
MILLENNIUM, SAME GLASS CEILING?: THE IMPACT OF LAW FIRM COMPENSATION 
SYSTEMS ON WOMEN (2010), available at http://worklifelaw.org/Publications/SameGlass 
Ceiling.pdf (documenting glass ceiling in law firms).  
 191. See, e.g., ANN ARNETT FERGUSON, BAD BOYS: PUBLIC SCHOOLS IN THE 
MAKING OF BLACK MASCULINITY 202–09 (2000) (discussing “acting white” as an implicit 
requirement of academic success and put-down).  
 192. See generally Ann C. McGinley, Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Michelle 
Obama: Performing Gender, Race, and Class on the Campaign Trail, 86 DENV. U. L. REV. 
709 (2009) (contrasting media treatment of Hillary Clinton, Sarah Palin, and Michelle 
Obama).  
 193. See, e.g., Kenji Yoshino, Covering, 111 YALE L.J. 769, 844 (2002) (defining 
“straight-acting”).  
 194. See, e.g., KEY CONCEPTS IN CULTURAL THEORY 42–43 (Andrew Edgar & Peter 
Sedgwick eds., 1999) (discussing benefits of being the norm in a binary opposition). So, it 
is not my fault that I was born male in this society, but I need to recognize that it provides 
me with certain benefits, not the least of which is having to worry much less about my 
safety. See generally Ann C. McGinley & Frank Rudy Cooper, Identities Cubed: 
Perspectives on Multidimensional Masculinities Theory, 13 NEV. L.J. 326 (2013) 
(introducing a new perspective on identities, law, and culture). Furthermore, I will keep 
getting the benefit of male privilege unless I choose to refuse those privileges and/or work 
for women’s substantive equality. Hence, the concept of privilege can be scary to some 
because recognizing it might bring responsibility.  
 195. See supra notes 148–150 and accompanying text (describing scaling of bodies).  
 196. See supra notes 151–154 and accompanying text (describing white transparency 
effect).  
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Privilege is also revealed in the extent that white and/or upper-
class New Yorkers did not complain about pervasive NYPD targeting 
of racial minorities in certain neighborhoods, which may be the result 
of their privilege not to notice the problem. As I noted in my Article 
Cultural Context Matters: Terry’s “Seesaw Effect,” white New Yorkers 
supported order-maintenance policing as trumpeted by Mayor Rudy 
Giuliani because they implicitly knew it would be targeted upon racial 
minorities.197 The cost of racial profiling for the people in the 
figurative back of the class was invisible to them. Privilege makes the 
costs of differential treatment invisible. 
B. A Revised Vulnerability Theory 
The move toward a better society should include vulnerability 
theory’s critique of autonomy and embrace of interdependence.198 I 
agree with vulnerability theory that the United States of America 
needs to wean itself from its over-prioritization of autonomy and 
liberty.199 We cannot just balance liberty with equality; however, we 
must replace our current, oversized notion of liberty with recognition 
of the importance of relationships. That would mean significantly 
changing our notion of how autonomous people are. We need to 
recognize that people are inherently relational. Here, I am thinking of 
the work of feminist relational psychologists, such as Carol Gilligan.200 
Their basic insight is that, from birth, we only develop our individual 
sense of self in the context of our relationships with others.201 
Since relationships include identities, a revised vulnerability 
theory should replace vulnerability theory’s universal subject with a 
multifaceted one made up of gender, race, sexual orientation, class, 
and religious affiliations, among others.202 This multifaceted subject 
 
 197. See Cooper, supra note 32, at 866 (arguing white Giuliani voters implicitly 
accepted racial profiling); Nunn, supra note 144, at 381 n.2 (discussing stereotype of black 
criminality).  
 198. See generally MARTHA ALBERTSON FINEMAN, THE AUTONOMY MYTH: A 
THEORY OF DEPENDENCY (2004) (critiquing assumption of autonomy, especially in 
family law). 
 199. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1714.  
 200. See generally TOWARD A FEMINIST DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY (Patricia H. 
Miller & Ellin Kofsky Scholnick eds., 2000) (collecting articles on relational psychology). 
 201. See, e.g., Campbell Leaper, The Social Construction and Socialization of Gender 
During Development, in TOWARD A FEMINIST DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra 
note 200, at 127, 134. See generally CLARE HUNTINGTON, FAILURE TO FLOURISH: HOW 
LAW UNDERMINES FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS (2014) (revamping family law around the 
importance of varied forms of relationships). 
 202. See, e.g., LYN MIKEL BROWN & CAROL GILLIGAN, MEETING AT THE 
CROSSROADS: WOMEN’S PSYCHOLOGY AND GIRLS’ DEVELOPMENT 29 (encouraging use 
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will be understood as having different aspects at the forefront 
depending on the social context.203 In other words, it would be the 
multidimensional subject that Fineman rejects.204 I am hoping, 
however, that after reconsidering the cruciality of identities in our 
present Western culture, Fineman and other vulnerability theorists 
will accept this revision of the theory. Meanwhile, after considering 
vulnerability theory, critical race feminists should come to see the 
constancy of vulnerability as a basis for productive coalitions 
encompassing varied groups and individuals. 
Coalition-building among varied groups and individuals will be 
aided by vulnerability theory’s recognition of how privilege operates. 
Recognizing that their privilege advantages them will allow the 
figurative front of the class to see that the game itself is corrupt. 
Further, vulnerability theory will allow the figurative front of the class 
to acknowledge that we are all dependent at some point. They can 
now see that there will be other “classrooms” where they will not be 
seated in the front, making them vulnerable in those environments. 
Since vulnerability theory says that, due to age, natural disaster, 
institutional dysfunction, and so forth, there is no exit from 
vulnerability, everyone has a stake in the fostering of resilience. 
In fostering resilience, I would eschew the current U.S. model, 
which checks the federal government with state sovereignty and 
balances equality with liberty, and instead prioritize the federal 
government and equality of opportunity. To begin, therefore, we 
must have a strong state. Vulnerability theory helps us make the case 
for that state by creating an affirmative duty for the state to prevent 
and redress injuries. The means of fulfilling that duty would be a 
continuous reevaluation of whether state institutions, including those 
merely supported by it, such as the family, are truly fostering 
resilience. Accordingly, the state must have the power and flexibility 
to address regional and national problems.  
The principle that courts would use to determine whether the 
strong state was truly fostering resilience would be a substantive 
approach to equality.205 As I discussed in Part II.B, vulnerability 
theory’s approach to substantive equality would assure meaningful 
 
of Listening Guide that considers “who is speaking, in what body . . . from whose 
perspective, in what societal and cultural frameworks . . .”). 
 203. See McGinley & Cooper, supra note 194, at 327–29 (explicating theory of 
multidimensional masculinities theory).  
 204. See Fineman, Feminism, Masculinities, supra note 9, at 634–35 (criticizing 
multidimensional masculinities theory).  
 205. See Fineman, Beyond Identities, supra note 9, at 1719, 1724–25.  
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opportunity for all. Under-educated children, currently taken as a 
norm in urban environments, would be an example of state failure. 
More specifically, vulnerability theory would now be able to look at 
both identities and privileges, so it could recognize both the under-
tracking of low socioeconomic status boys of color and the silent 
shunting of mostly whites into the honors classes as state failures. We 
need a vulnerability theory that insists on a responsive state but 
makes that state aware of the ways that identities privilege some and 
disadvantage others. 
C. Revising Racial Profiling 
Having concentrated in this Article on revising vulnerability 
theory, I will not canvas the extensive racial profiling literature but 
will describe one option. It seems to me that in a world governed by a 
revised vulnerability theory, young black males could bring a suit for 
the failure of police departments to treat them properly. The suit 
would be to have the responsive state act strongly by mandating a 
nationwide overhaul of police departments. I suggest that this be 
accomplished in three steps. First, require the tops of police 
departments to make clear declarations of a new day with respect to 
racial profiling. Second, change hiring policies into a comprehensive 
measure of likelihood not to racially profile. That would mean 
seeking college degrees, deemphasizing military backgrounds, testing 
for implicit bias, and any other measures necessary. Finally, I suggest 
retraining existing beat police officers to avoid racial profiling. Much 
more detail will be needed on these measures, but that will be a 
project for another day. 
CONCLUSION 
I wrote this Article because I was both drawn to and concerned 
about vulnerability theory. I expressed my concern in Part I, wherein 
I detailed the factors contributing to continuing police targeting of 
young racial minority men. In Part II, I detailed aspects of 
vulnerability theory, emphasizing the value of its acknowledgement of 
our interdependence and call for a strong state with a substantive 
approach to equality. In Part III, I critiqued other aspects of 
vulnerability theory as failing to recognize that there is no universal 
subjectivity and that identities are materially crucial. In Part IV, I 
started the revision of vulnerability theory by calling for the 
incorporation of analysis of privilege. 
I end my investigation of vulnerability theory with buoyed hope 
that, when linked to analysis of privilege, it can be the capacious 
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theory that helps us fight targeting of young racial minority men. If 
young men of color are going to continue to be always already suspect 
to the police for the foreseeable future—and they are—then 
vulnerability theory must recognize that reality by incorporating 
recognition of the relative privileges conferred by different identity 
statuses. Revising vulnerability theory might be the necessary step 
toward a state that is strong enough and principled enough to remedy 
the vulnerability of being always already suspect. 
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